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Abstract
Cryptographic protocols for key distribution and authentication play an important
role in Internet security. Certain ﬂaws in these protocols can be discovered using
term rewriting models to express the protocol, the malicious network environment,
and vulnerability search strategies.
1 Cryptographic Protocol Security
Cryptographic protocols are short, simple exchanges of messages whose pur-
pose is to distribute secret keys to communicating parties. These keys can be
used to transmit conﬁdential information or to authenticate messages.
For example, consider the following protocol:
A -> B: {A,Na}pk(B)
B -> A: {Na,Nb}pk(A)
A -> B: {Nb}pk(B)
Each line, of the form A → B : M , means that A sends the message M
to B, and each one changes state as a result. The expression {A,Na}pk(B)
represents the encryption of the concatenated ﬁelds A and Na with the public
key of B. Na and Nb are session-speciﬁc values called “nonces” that are, in
this protocol, kept secret and could be used later as session keys.
Speciﬁcations of this type are called “Alice-and-Bob” speciﬁcations be-
cause of the names conventionally given to the participants A and B in ex-
amples. Note, however, that an actual protocol user, like Alice, can start any
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number of processes, and some of them can play the A role while others play
the B role.
This protocol is a portion of a longer one published in 1978; it was found
to be insecure in 1996 [8]. It is possible for a third party (“Mallory”) to
masquerade as Alice to Bob, while carrying on a concurrent session of the
protocol (as Mallory in the B role) with Alice. The vulnerability can be
discovered from the abstract presentation above, given only an idealized notion
of encryption and a simple attacker model, and all of these can be represented
using term rewriting rules.
The security properties most often stated and analyzed for cryptographic
protocols are secrecy and authentication. Session keys and user data should
be kept secret, and the recipient of a session key or important data (say, a
contract) should be able to conﬁrm the identity of the sender. These are safety
properties, i.e., state invariants. Some protocols have more complex security
goals, but there is no consensus on how to state them. Liveness properties are
usually considered performance rather than security properties.
2 Protocol Modeling
The earliest mathematical model of a class of cryptographic protocols, by
Dolev and Yao [7], was a rewrite rule model. That paper studied “ping-pong”
protocols between a pair of legitimate parties in which the ﬁrst message is an
encrypted secret, and each party receiving a message applies a state-dependent
sequence of public key operators to it and returns the result. State transition
rules might, for example, rewrite a received message x to EB(DA(x)), where
EA means encryption with A’s public key. There are reduction rules like
Dx(Ex(y))→ y. Honest parties have to follow the procotol, while a malicious
party Z could intercept any message, apply any combination of Ex for any x
and the malicious party’s decryption operator DZ , and forward the result to
either party in any session. The attack objective was to expose the secret that
was sent encrypted in the ﬁrst message. The security problem is decidable for
this very restricted model and also for minor extensions of it.
The term “Dolev-Yao” model is now often used to refer to any protocol
model in which the attacker can intercept and redirect messages, and modify
their content using axiomatically deﬁned operations and data available to the
attacker.
To make the cryptographic protocol problem undecidable, we need only
assume, ﬁrst, that two terms can be concatenated into a longer message, and,
second, that there is an unbounded set of items of some type, usually called
“nonces.” Nonces serve as unique identiﬁers to distinguish diﬀerent sessions
[3].
There has been some eﬀort to identify restricted classes of protocols for
which it is suﬃcient to examine a bounded number of sessions. For example,
there is Lowe’s “small system” result, in which only one instance of each role
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in the procotol is enough to reveal possible ﬂaws [9]. But the conditions for
this result are very restrictive. State exploration approaches generally perform
a bounded, iteratively expanding search.
Mitchell’s recent multiset rewrite rule (MSR) model [3], inspired by linear
logic, is both simple and general enough for extension to real protocols. In the
MSR model, a system state is a ﬁnite collection of “facts,” which are ground
terms of three kinds: states of protocol parties, such as A0(a, b) (A is in state
0 of a protocol between a and b); messages transmitted to the network, such
as N({a, b}); and message components memorized by the attacker, such as
M(a).
A protocol rule shows how states are updated and messages are produced,
for example
A0(A,B)→ (∃K)A1(A,B,K), N({A}K),
where the quantiﬁer has the special meaning that the key variable K is to
be instantiated with a nonce. A state fact in the system state multiset that
matches the left side is removed and replaced by the similarly instantiated
right side. (The system state is a multiset because certain rules, such as
session initialization or message creation rules, permit any number of copies
of some terms to be generated.)
The model also includes attacker rules, by which, for example, the attacker
can decrypt encrypted terms and add the result to its memory, such as
M({A}K),M(K)→M({A}K),M(K),M(A).
Note that the attacker model is ﬁxed and universal, given the selection of
encryption and other computational functions used by the protocol.
There are other models, such as specialized epistemic authentication logics
[2] and process algebra representations [15,1], but they have less of a term
rewriting ﬂavor.
3 Protocol Analysis
There are techniques for proving that cryptographic protocols satisfy secu-
rity properties. An inﬂuential paper by Paulson demonstrated an inductive
technique to prove conﬁdentiality or authentication invariants [14], and there
have been others, using models similar in spirit to the MSR model. Proofs
using authentication logics are useful for understanding protocols, but they
work by “idealizing” the protocol into logical statements in a way that is not
algorithmic and which loses some information kept by state-transition models.
Proving protocol security is most useful when the protocol is in fact secure.
If the protocol has a vulnerability, as most do, at least in their initial versions,
it is productive to implement some form of state search.
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3.1 Using Prolog
The oldest approaches to cryptographic protocol analysis use Prolog. It is
easy to express the state of a protocol party as a Prolog term, and a message
is also a term, so that the global state of the environment is a list of such
states and messages. A global state transition updates some party’s state and
may add a new message.
The Interrogator, a Prolog program for protocol analysis [12], was a set
of Prolog rules expressing a relation reachable(H,Q) meaning that global
state Q was reachable via the message sequence H. In a typical reachability
query, Q was partly instantiated to an insecure state, and H was a variable,
to be instantiated by a successful Prolog seach for an attack. Prolog’s built-in
resolution algorithm performs backward search from the insecure goal state
to the initial state. The challenge for this approach was termination, not
only because of the inherent undecidability, but because of the need to rein
in Prolog’s depth-ﬁrst search. A partial answer was to make the program
interactive, to take advantage of user guidance.
One of the improvements introduced by Meadows’ NRL Protocol Ana-
lyzer [11], also a Prolog program, was the explicit use of narrowing. Narrow-
ing solves equations modulo canonical sets of rewrite rules; and the rules for
reducing symbolic encryption, such as dec(K,enc(K,X)) = X, are canonical.
One way to use narrowing, adopted also in later versions of the Interroga-
tor, is to ﬁnd predecessor states. Suppose the protocol includes a transition
rule Q,M → Q′, meaning that there can be a network state transition from
Q to Q′ when message M is received; and the attacker’s goal is the partly
instantiated state Qa. Now suppose narrowing succeeds in solving Q
′ = Qa
with the substitution σ. Then the attacker’s job is reduced to reaching the
state σQ and generating the message σM .
The use of narrowing brings to light another challenge, when the protocol
makes use of non-canonical operations, such as commutative and associative
operations. For example, bitwise modulo-two addition (exclusive-or) is used
in many protocols as an encryption operator.
3.2 Application of Model-Checking Tools
There have been many recent successess in the application of existing model
checking tools, which had been developed for other purposes such as pro-
cessor “hardware” design, to cryptographic protocol analysis. The stimulus
was a paper by Roscoe on the use of FDR [15], followed by Lowe’s result on
the Needham-Schroeder protocol [8]. Other researchers realized that similar
techniques could be used with their own tools [10,13]. The combination of
modern computing power, model checking advances such as BDDs, and a few
protocol-speciﬁc optimizations, made it possible to ﬁnd previously undiscov-
ered vulnerabilities in a reasonable execution time, with no user interaction
after the initial encoding and setup.
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The lessons learned about modelling and search optimizations could then
be applied in other ways. One remarkable result is the ability of Maude, a
rewriting logic system rather than a model checker, to become a model checker.
Using meta-level excution strategies, it performs iterative breadth-ﬁrst state
search and takes advantage of state reduction optimizations suitable for the
protocol problem. In this way it has achieved performance comparable to
model checking tools [5,4].
It is also possible to program a new model checker that is customized for
the protocol problem. An unusual approach to this was taken by Athena [16],
using the strand space model [17]. In this model, the state of the network is a
single structure called a bundle, consisting of nodes that are partially ordered
by causality. A strand is a string of adjacent nodes ordered by execution se-
quence from the same process. A protocol speciﬁes possible legal strands with
parameterized strands, i.e., strand expressions with variable parameters, and
these can be connected into semibundles by joining transmitted and received
messages. Athena attempts to expand a small semibundle containing a se-
curity violation into a complete bundle. It is eﬃcient because of its use of
partial ordering and because the state expansion introduces an entire strand
at a time. A semibundle could be regarded as a large complex term. It would
be interesting to see if a general term-rewriting system could be adapted to
follow this approach.
4 Conclusions
There are natural and practical ways to apply term rewriting concepts and
tools to the security analysis of cryptographic protocols. Term rewriting can
also be applied to this area in other ways beyond the speciﬁc ones mentioned
above, such as to implement part of a translator from a high level protocol
language to a rule representation, as was done using Maude in the CAPSL
translator [6]. We might also look forward to beneﬁts from advances in related
areas such as narrowing algorithms, and perhaps from extensions such as graph
rewriting.
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